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SYMPOSIUM: GIVING KOREMATSU V. UNITED 
STATES A SOBER SECOND THOUGHT 
 
Arkansas Law Review Editorial Board 
INTRODUCTION  
We are elated to present Professor Mark Killenbeck’s 
thought provoking article, Sober Second Thought?  Korematsu 
Reconsidered.  Killenbeck dives into the Korematsu opinion and 
its history with great care to determine whether it truly “has no 
place in law under the Constitution” as Chief Justice John Roberts 
declared in Trump v. Hawaii.1 While Korematsu’s result provides 
an understandable “impulse to condemn” it, Killenbeck shows us 
that focusing solely on the case’s result “stands apart from and in 
stark contrast to its most important place in the constitutional or-
der: articulation of precepts and terminology that provide the 
foundations for strict scrutiny.”2 
Killenbeck also shows us that the result-oriented viewpoint 
which has led many to consider Korematsu and Trump “as two 
peas in the same pod does not do justice to either.”3  The seem-
ingly obvious parallels between the two cases are in fact superfi-
cial.4  While the “record is quite clear regarding Korematsu and 
the Japanese . . . we simply do not have the facts necessary to 
reach similar conclusions about Trump.”5 
Killenbeck’s article is “intentionally provocative,” and he 
acknowledges there will be many who will disagree with the ar-
gument he puts forward in the pages that follow.6  Killenbeck 
welcomes the challenge and has invited several of the most 
 
1 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing).  
2 Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV. 
152, 156 (2021). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 157.  
6 Id. at 235.  
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prominent constitutional scholars in the legal academy to offer 
their thoughts, endorsements, and critiques of his work.  
Professor Jack M. Balkin distills Killenbeck’s argument 
down to two points—and takes issue with each.7 First, Balkin crit-
icizes the notion that the quality of the Supreme Court’s decision-
making process “should be central to the honor and dishonor we 
bestow on Supreme Court decisions.”8  To Balkin, the impact of 
a decision is more important because the “canon (and the anti-
canon) are constructed by cultural memory, and cultural memory 
is largely agnostic, if not ignorant, of” the Court’s underlying de-
cision-making process.9 
Second, Balkin is skeptical that Korematsu deserves “any 
credit—much less respect—as the font of the strict scrutiny doc-
trine.”10  Where Korematsu paid mere lip service to strictly scru-
tinizing racial classifications, later Courts took Korematsu’s 
“sanctimonious pronouncements” and gave them value by strik-
ing down racially discriminatory laws and practices.11  For Bal-
kin, it is these cases, such as Oyama v. California, that deserve 
canonical status—not Korematsu.12 
Professor Sanford Levinson implores you to read “Mark 
Killenbeck’s truly superb essay . . . with the utmost care.”13  Lev-
inson’s response illustrates the value of Killenbeck’s work by div-
ing into the lessons—good and bad—that Korematsu teaches us.  
The good side of Korematsu is found in its role as an “origin 
story” of strict scrutiny.14  Levinson praises Killenbeck’s “treat-
ment of Korematsu” for offering “a splendid introduction” to the 
Equal Protection Clause’s journey from “the ‘last resort’ of des-
perate lawyers” to “one of the linchpins of American constitu-
tional argument.”15 
 
7 Jack M. Balkin, Korematsu as the Tribute that Vice Pays to Virtue, 74 ARK. L. REV. 255 
(2021).  
8 Id. at 258. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 260. 
11 Id. at 263. 
12 Balkin, supra note 7, at 263. 
13 Sanford Levinson, Korematsu, Hawaii, and Pedagogy, 74 ARK. L. REV. 269 (2021). 
14 Id. at 277.  
15 Id. 
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The bad side of Korematsu is exemplified by the case’s hold-
ing and “the legal process that produced it.”16  Levinson describes 
Killenbeck’s “portrayal of the lawyers who defended Order 9066 
in front of the Supreme Court” as “devastating.”17  This devastat-
ing portrayal is not only valuable in explaining the outcome of 
Korematsu.  It is also “important that students know all of this in 
order to understand that the law does not always ‘work itself 
pure,’ that the process itself can be gravely defective, with at-
tendant costs both to the fabric of the law and, more importantly, 
to the victims of given decisions.”18 
Professor Darrell A.H. Miller reflects on the nature of 
“tainted precedent” within our judicial system.19  These prece-
dents offer “reasonable, even valuable” legal principles but are 
“buried deep within problematic or even odious opinions.”20  
Sometimes the taint is a result of the author,21 other times because 
the Court’s justifications for its decision are discredited,22 and 
other times precedent is tainted because the valuable legal princi-
ple is not applied “to the ends of justice or is mired in problematic 
or offensive reasoning on other issues.”23  Then there are cases 
which are “so tainted that their citation for any proposition other 
than condemnation is typically considered intolerable.”24  Kore-
matsu is one such “anticanonical” case.25  
Miller praises Killenbeck’s treatment of the tainted prece-
dent dilemma presented by Korematsu.  Miller acknowledges that 
Korematsu is “contaminated with racism” but that shameful his-
tory “is not sufficient to sap it of its utility.”26  Burying Kore-
matsu’s valuable legal proposition solely because it “comes out 
of a racist past” is to follow a rule that “would leave us with pre-
cious little of the public good left.”27  Instead, Miller implores us 
to be “circumspect” and “vigilant” about how the law is made, 
 
16 Id. at 276. 
17 Id. at 282. 
18 Id. at 277.  
19 Darrell A.H. Miller, Tainted Precedent, 74 ARK. L. REV. 291 (2021). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 292. 
22 Id. at 293.  
23 Id. 
24 Miller, supra note 19, at 294.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 295. 
27 Id. 
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applied, and enforced.28  In this regard, Miller sees Killenbeck’s 
article “as providing a valuable service.”29 
Professor Eric L. Muller advises us not to mistake the 
Court’s opinion in Korematsu “for an exhaustive account of the 
relevant history.”30  By broadening the scope of consideration, 
one is able to appreciate the historical importance of people and 
events not covered in the Court’s opinion.31  Muller illustrates this 
“Korematsu myopia” by noting the history of this very journal.32  
Robert A. Leflar—Dean of the University of Arkansas School of 
Law when the Arkansas Law Review was founded—served as Re-
gional Attorney and Assistant Solicitor in the War Relocation Au-
thority from 1942 to 1944.33 
Muller remedies this common myopic view of Korematsu by 
diving into the historical record leading up to the enactment of 
Order 9066, concluding that despite the order’s neutral language 
there was an invidious purpose embedded within it.34  This is in 
stark contrast to Killenbeck’s argument that Order 9066 itself was 
neutral but that invidious purpose and disparate impact arose due 
to “a racially motivated enforcer.”35  To Muller, Korematsu my-
opia has led to Killenbeck grounding his argument “in an error of 
historical fact.”36  Thus, Korematsu and Trump’s factual founda-
tions “are not the reverse of each other, but the same.”37 
Professor Robert L. Tsai appreciates Killenbeck’s “thought-
ful and contrarian paper,” but remains unsold that Korematsu de-
serves saving.38  Tsai does agree with Killenbeck that Korematsu 
has pedagogical value as “an object lesson in bad faith.”39 He dis-
agrees, however, that Korematsu should be seen as a foundation 
of strict scrutiny and questions the value of the strict scrutiny 
 
28 Id. 
29 Miller, supra note 19, at 296.  
30 Eric L. Muller, There Was Nothing “Neutral” About Executive Order 9066, 74 ARK. L. 
REV. 297 (2021). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 298. 
33 Id. at 298, n.9. 
34 Id. at 301-03.  
35 Muller, supra note 30, at 300.  
36 Id. at 301.  
37 Id. at 304.  
38 Robert L. Tsai, A Proper Burial, 74 ARK. L. REV. 307, 307 (2021). 
39 Id. at 308.  
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doctrine in general.40  Tsai, much like Balkin, believes that any-
thing valuable lurking within Korematsu “can be found in less 
tainted form elsewhere.”41  Moreover, Tsai argues that reflexive 
use of strict scrutiny “could even be counterproductive, by pro-
moting an unthinking refusal to grapple with the serious stakes of 
a constitutional dispute.”42  Thus, Korematsu simply doesn’t offer 
anything worth saving.  
Tsai likens Killenbeck’s discussion of Trump v. Hawaii to 
“damage control.”43  While Tsai agrees “that the ruling on the 
merits is defensible,”44 he asks us to consider what “might start to 
approach the ideal [and] on that score, Trump v. Hawaii falls woe-
fully short.”45  Instead, considering Korematsu and Trump to-
gether shows that “a president’s ability to inflict mass suffering 
has grown exponentially,”46 while “making it easier for govern-
ment officials to disregard their obligations.”47 
Professor Mark Tushnet takes Killenbeck’s article as a 
chance to consider the saying that we are “a government of laws, 
not a government of men and women.”48  This view, however, 
ignores that “men and women appear at the stages of enactment, 
application, and adjudication.”49  According to Tushnet, the say-
ing should really go “a government of laws but also a government 
of men and women.”50   
Korematsu and Trump provide Tushnet an opportunity to ex-
amine the human element’s role in our legal system.  While both 
cases involved a facially neutral executive order, both involved 
people with racially discriminatory motivations at the enactment 
and application stages.51  Tushnet goes on to show that at the in-
terpretation stage of both cases, the Supreme Court possibly es-




42 Id. at 309. 
43 Tsai, supra note 38, at 312. 
44 Id. at 313. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 317.  
47 Id. at 322.  
48 Mark Tushnet, A Government of Law that is a Government of Men and Women, 74 ARK. 
L. REV. 323, 323 (2021) 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See generally id. 
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enactment process can be cleansed by actions at another part.”52  
While this approach may vindicate “the idea we have a govern-
ment of laws” by “cleansing” individual government actors’ per-
sonal racism from our laws,  it still “allows critics to continue to 
fairly describe the policies as objectively systemically racist.”53 
On behalf of the Arkansas Law Review, we would like to 
express our sincerest gratitude to each of the incredible scholars 
who so generously contributed to this series.  Specifically, we 
would like to thank Professor Mark R. Killenbeck for publishing 
his insightful article in our journal and for bringing together this 
prestigious group of commentators.  By doing so, Professor 
Killenbeck has made yet another significant contribution to both 
the legal discourse and the Arkansas Law Review.54 
 
52 Id. at 327.  
53 Tushnet, supra note 48, at 328.  
54 In 2019, our journal published a series debating McCulloch v. Maryland—a series made 
possible by Professor Killenbeck and appropriately dubbed a “scholarly birthday party for 
McColloch” by David S. Schwartz.  See 72 ARK. L. REV. 1, 1-163 (2019).  Last year, Pro-
fessor Killenbeck assembled a similarly prestigious group of scholars to discuss Schwartz’s 
book, The Spirit of the Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCul-
loch v. Maryland.  See 73 ARK. L. REV. 69, 69-133 (2020).   
